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Abstract. We extend much research that has been devoted to the effects of the EMU on
international trade by introducing monetary regime variables in bilateral export equations with
the objective of capturing the effects on trade of changes in monetary regimes relative the pure
EMU effects. In addition, we make a strong attempt to distinguish between EU and EMU
effects on trade. To identify these different effects we include three groups of countries in our
sample: EMU countries which are also members of the EU, EU countries outside the EMU and
non-EU countries. The last control group consists of either non-EU industrial countries or nonEU industrial plus emerging market countries in the empirical analysis.
Asian experiences with inflation targeting are discussed and compared to the empirical
results we obtain for trade effects of monetary regimes. Even if deeper monetary integration
leads to greater trade expansion, it involves political complexity. The choice of an appropriate
monetary regime can be a relatively simple unilateral tool for expanding trade.
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The Impact of Monetary Regimes on International Trade: Are EU
Experiences Relevant for Asia?

1. Introduction
The perceived success of regional integration in Europe has inspired debate in other parts of the
world about potential economic benefits of different types of integration. In Asia in particular,
monetary and financial integration has received attention. What are the benefits and how large
are they? In this study we focus on trade effects of monetary integration and monetary policy
regimes. The formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was associated with a monetary
regime shift for most of the countries joining the currency union. Thus, trade creation effects of
the currency union per se should be distinguished from trade volume effects of monetary regime
shifts. From the point of view of Asian countries we ask whether substantial trade expansion can
be achieved by the appropriate choice of monetary and exchange rate regimes without having to
take on the political complications associated with a currency union.
We argue that the commonly observed trade creating effect of the formation of the EMU
on January 1, 1999 may not be a pure single currency effect but it may be caused by reduced
macroeconomic uncertainty in many EMU countries as a result of changes in monetary policy
institutions, procedures and targets. Several countries that later became members of the EMU
had pre-EMU central banks with little credibility in terms of a monetary policy targets, and the
targets shifted strongly towards low inflation with the creation of the EMU. To the extent EMU
effects are the result of changes in policy-making institutions, procedures and targets, the lesson
from EMU might be that institutions and targets should be changed and the currency union itself
could be relatively unimportant.
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Inflation targeting has become a common monetary policy regime and it has been
observed by, for example, Rose (2007) that this regime contributes to exchange rate
predictability in spite of the flexibility of exchange rates associated with this regime. Thus, we
may ask whether a shift to inflation targeting can substitute for a currency union for countries
seeking to expand trade.
We extend much research that has been devoted to the effects of the EMU on
international trade by introducing monetary regime variables in bilateral export equations with
the objective of capturing the effects on trade of changes in monetary regimes relative the pure
EMU effects. In addition, we make a strong attempt to distinguish between EU and EMU effects
on trade. To identify these different effects we include three groups of countries in our sample;
EMU countries which are also members of the EU, EU countries outside the EMU and non-EU
countries. The last control group consists of either non-EU industrial countries or non-EU
industrial plus emerging market countries in the empirical analysis.
The selection of control groups along with other econometric issues are frequently
identified as the cause of the sensitivity and discrepancy of the estimates of the common
currency effects on trade in different studies (Frankel, 2008). Rose (2001), who initiated the
research on trade effects of currency unions, found extremely large effects of currency unions on
trade. Due to unavailability of trade data for the EMU countries at the time of study, Rose
analyzed trade creation effects of currency unions in existence before the EMU. Using a sample
covering 186 countries during the period 1970-1990, he finds that the value of trade among
countries using the same currency would increase by more than 200 percent.
Most economists found Rose’s result implausible. Much research has been devoted to
refining the analysis. Although the estimated trade effects of a common currency have been
2

substantially reduced, the magnitude of the effects varies substantially across studies. For
example, Persson (2001) finds the trade effect of the common currency of 13%-66%. Drawing
conclusions based specifically on the effect of EMU, Micco et al (2003) obtain an intra-EMU
trade effect of 7%-10% and Berger and Nitsch (2008) find the effect to be 31%.1
Frankel (2008) reviews much of the literature with the objective of explaining the
discrepancy among the studies. He estimates a gravity model of the euro effect on trade
employed in earlier studies. He identifies five possible factors that could explain the discrepancy
among estimates among those studies; i) the long-run and lag effects of the euro, ii) the bias from
omitting variables capturing specific characteristics of a country pair, iii) causality problems, iv)
the implausible magnitude of the estimate, and v) the comparison of the currency union effects
for countries with different size. Frankel’s estimates of the euro effect on trade lie within a very
wide range from 10 percent to 200 percent. He does not introduce alternative monetary regimes,
however.
In Frankel’s study, the largest euro-effect on trade is found when estimates are obtained
within the EU sample. Time series effects are important in this case. The euro effect on bilateral
trade flows becomes lower when using the sample of developed countries and even lower or
insignificant in the model specification with the full sample including developing countries. The
euro effects are also sensitive to the length of the pre- and post-EMU periods in the sample.
Although there is evidence of significantly increasing trade among the EMU member countries
during 1999-2002, the effect of the euro on trade did not continue to rise from 2002 through
2006.

1

See Angkinand, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2009) for a comprehensive review of literature on the trade effect of a
common currency.

3

Our empirical analysis of EU and EMU effects is based a sample of 68 countries during
the period 1980-2007. Taking account of monetary regimes as well, the analysis is limited to the
period of 1999-2007. Since the EMU was formed in 1999, the EMU effects identified for this
shorter period can be thought of as cross-section effects of the EMU while the longer period
takes into account time series effects to a greater extent.
The disadvantage with the longer period from the point of view of drawing implications
for Asia is that many unidentified aspects of the deepening integration within the EU may
influence the results. We make an attempt to distinguish between EU and EMU effects, however.
The disadvantage with the shorter period wherein cross section effects of the EMU and the EU
are more important is that we may miss important effects unless relevant cross-section
characteristics of counties can be identified and controlled for.
In the following section 2 we describe the data and empirical methodology on EU-,
EMU- and monetary regime effects on bilateral exports. The empirical results with respect to
trade effects of the EMU, the EU and monetary regimes are reported in Section 3. In Section 4
trade effects in percent of membership in the EU, the EMU and monetary regime groups are
calculated taking into account that membership in these groups are overlapping. Thereafter, we
turn in Section 5 to experiences with inflation targeting, in particular, in Asia. We show how
trade has developed for four countries that have adopted inflation targeting and interpret these
developments in light of the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, lessons for Asia are
discussed in the concluding Section 6.

2. Analyzing effects of EU, EMU and monetary regimes on bilateral exports: data
and approach.
4

We estimate the effects of EMU, EU and monetary regimes on exports using the panel
data model. Our sample includes 68 industrial and emerging market economies during 19802007. When analyzing the effect of monetary regimes on exports, the sample period coverage is
limited to 1999-2007 due to the availability of consistent monetary regime data.
Following Flam and Nordstrom (2003) we use bilateral exports as the dependent variable
in an extended gravity model with dummies for EU and EMU country groups and monetary
regime characteristics. The purpose of using bilateral exports, and not total bilateral trade flows,
(bilateral exports plus imports) is to be able to examine whether the monetary regime of
exporters or importers generally and more significantly affect trade. Country-pair and year- fixed
effects dummies are included in the panel regressions in order to minimize bias caused by time
trends and special country relationships as suggested in the existing literature.2 The model
specification is as follows:
Log(Export)12,t = α + β1Log(GDP)1,t+β2Log(GDP)2,t + β3 Log(POP)1,t + β4 Log(POP)2,t+

β5RER1,t + β6RER2,t + β7RTA12,t + γj EU/EMUj,12,t + θkMonetary
Regimek,1,t + ωkMonetary Regimek,2,t +ν12 + μt + ε12,t
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the real value (in U.S. dollar) of bilateral
exports from an exporting country (with subscript 1) to an importing country (with subscribe 2)
at year t. The exports data are from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (the August, 2009
version). GDP is the real GDP (in U.S. dollar), POP is the total population, and RER is the real
exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar. RTA is a dummy of one if two countries belong to the
same Regional Trade Arrangement. νij denotes the unobserved characteristics of a country pair,

μt denotes the unobservable time effects, and εijt is an error term.
2

See, for example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Micco et al (2003) and Carrère (2006).
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Our main interest is the two independent variables: EU/EMU and Monetary Regime. To
study the currency union effect and the EU effect separately, we group the countries observations
into three groups, which are: 1) the member countries of EMU, 2) the EU countries that are not
the EMU members including members of the European Economic Area, EEA (EU/nonEMU),
and 3) the non-EU countries (nonEU). Table 1 reports the list of countries in each group as well
as the year that countries become the members of EMU and EU/nonEMU.
[Table 1 here]
The important aspect of the EU/nonEMU that we try to capture is the internal market that
got a boost with the 1992 program. In creating the “internal market” with the so called “four
motilities” of goods, services, labor, and capital, a great variety of discriminatory practices in
markets of all kinds were removed and in some areas rules and regulation were harmonized,
although the legal frameworks remain very different across countries in Europe. For this reason,
EU/nonEMU includes the EU 15 plus Norway and Iceland starting in 19923. In 1999, 11 EU
countries became EMU members while the other 6 countries remained EU/nonEMU. Greece
became an EMU country in 2001. Remaining outside are Denmark, Sweden and the U.K., plus
Iceland and Norway that participate in the Internal Market as members of the European
Economic Area. In 2004, 10 countries in Eastern Europe became EU/nonEMU. The nonEU
group for the whole period includes 6 developed countries and 32 emerging market economies,
of which 9 are emerging Asian countries.
From the three groups of exporting counties and three groups of importing countries, we
can analyze the difference of bilateral exports among nine pairs of countries; 1) EMU exports to
EMU, 2) EMU exports to EU/Non-EMU, 3) EMU exports to non-EU, 4) EU/NonEMU exports
3

Austria, Finland and Sweden did not become members of the EU until 1995 but they were participating in the
internal market. Therefore, we treat them the same way as pre-1995 EU 12 members.
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to EMU, 5) EU/nonEMU exports to EU/Non EMU, 6) EU/NonEMU exports to non EU, 7) NonEU exports to EMU, 8) Non-EU exports to EU/non EMU, and 9) Non-EU exports to Non-EU.
The EU/EMU in the model specification above, therefore, refers to the first eight country
pair dummies. The ninth country pair dummy capturing exports from Non-EU to other Non-EU
countries is omitted to avoid the perfect multicollinearity.
Monetary Regime data in different years are obtained from the IMF’s Classification of
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks, which is available from 1999.
IMF classifies monetary policy frameworks into five group: exchange rate anchor, monetary
aggregate anchor, inflation targeting framework, IMF-supported or other monetary program, and
Other frameworks (such as the conduct of monetary policy without an explicitly stated nominal
anchor). The descriptions of these monetary regimes variables are summarized in the Table 2.
According to the IMF data, the countries in the Euro Area are counted within the last group.
However, in our empirical analysis the member countries of EMU are treated as inflation target
countries as well as members of the EMU group.
[Table 2 here]
The nature of monetary regimes has implication for the compatibility of exchange rate
regimes. They also represent an indirect channel through which the monetary policy has effect
on trade through predictability of exchange rates and interest rates in particular. More
specifically, the monetary regime data shows that countries that follow inflation targeting and
monetary aggregate regimes tend to have more flexible exchange rate policy such as crawling
band, managed float with no pre-announced path for exchange rate, and independent float. The
Exchange rate anchor regime involves more rigid exchange rate policy such as arrangements
with no separate legal tender, pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands, crawling pegs, and
7

other conventional fixed peg arrangements. The remaining two regimes, IMF supported and
‘Other’, have countries that practice a variety of exchange rate regimes from exchange rate
arrangements with no separate legal tender, managed float, and independent float. Table 3
reports the exchange rate- and monetary regimes for 9 Asian economies from 1999. Note that
some countries are classified as adopting more than one nominal anchor in conducting monetary
policy within the same period (e.g. China has adopted both exchange rate anchor and monetary
aggregate regimes. Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines had adopted the monetary aggregate and
IMF-supported during the post-Asian crisis period). According to IMF, it would not be possible
to determine which of the two monetary regimes plays the principal role in conducting monetary
policy.
[Table 3 here]
3. Effects of the EU, the EMU and monetary regimes on bilateral exports
We begin by showing the trade effects of the EMU and the EU in a baseline model
without controlling for monetary regime characteristics in Table 4. Thereafter, monetary regime
characteristics are introduced in Table 5. The regressions in both tables include country-pair and
year fixed effects. In Table 4, we report results based on the sample of industrial alone (IND) and
the sample of ALL countries (industrial and emerging market countries). According to previous
studies, the control group matters in drawing the conclusion regarding the euro effects on
international trade. Most studies include only countries with similar characteristics such as
western European or OECD countries on the grounds that developing countries are too different
to be useful as a control group. We take into account different country characteristics between
industrial and emerging countries by including an interactive dummy for time and emerging
market country in the regressions using a sample for ALL countries as exporters or importers.
8

The baseline panel regressions in Table 4 are based on the time period of 1980-2007. The
results in both regressions based on the sample of IND and ALL show that exporters’ and
importers’ GDPs and populations are significant with expected signs. This result is consistent to
the gravity model where bilateral trade flows depend positively on national income of a pair of
countries.4 The effects of bilateral real exchange rates (of exporters and importers relative to the
dollar) and the regional trade agreement dummy, RTA, are generally significant but the sign for
the exporter county’s real exchange rate depends on whether emerging market economies are
included in the sample coverage.
The eight EU and EMU dummies are generally significant. The magnitude and
significance levels of each dummy is compared to the omitted dummy, namely the exports from
non-EU to other non-EU countries. In both regressions, the largest coefficient is obtained from
bilateral exports between EMU countries (EMU1 to EMU2). The next groups that have relatively
large trade effects are between EMU and EU/nonEMU countries, and between EU/NonEMU
countries. We discuss the relative magnitudes of coefficients below. Without controlling for
different monetary regimes across countries, the results in Table 4 support the trade creation
effects of both the adoption of the euro and the formation of internal markets.
The main difference of results in the two regressions in Table 4 is when bilateral trade
involves non-EU countries and whether the non-EU country group includes either industrial and
emerging market countries or industrial countries alone. In the first regression using the IND
sample, all dummies are positive and significant except the coefficient for exports from non-EU
to EMU. Using industrial countries as a control group, this result would indicate that the EMU
4

The gravity model also predicts that bilateral trade flows depends negatively on the distance between two
countries, reflecting lower transportation and other transaction costs being associated with more trade. Since the
country-pair fixed effects are included in the panel regressions, the distance variable, which is time-invariant, cannot
be included due to the perfect multicollinearity.
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has had a relatively large effect of trade among the member countries as well as from the
member countries to all countries outside the EU and EMU. When emerging markets are
included in the control group for EU and EMU effects, the coefficients for trade between NonEU
countries and EU/NonEMU countries becomes negative indicating that the formation of the EU,
as well as the formation of the EMU, may have diverted trade of members of these groups from
Non-EU countries to other members of the same groups. Another possibility discussed below is
that the coefficients for trade effects of the EU and the EMU capture other factors that affected
the development of trade over time. We return to this issue below.
[Table 4 here]
The first column in Table 5 shows the regression for the period 1999-2007 with
unchanged specification relative to Table 4 regressions.5 Thus, the EMU effects and the EU
effects in Table 5 are dominated by cross-section effects of membership in these groups while
the coefficients in Table 4 are influenced strongly by time series effects. If all relevant variables
affecting the volume of trade between countries had been included the coefficients should be
similar. The coefficients are very different, however, indicating substantial sensitivity to the
regression specification as noted by Frankel (2008). In his study, the EMU effect on trade was
significant for the period 1999-2004 but insignificant as in Table 5 when the period of the study
was extended to 2006.
Missing variables could affect the cross-section effects of the EMU and the EU in Table
5 as well as the time series effects in Table 4. All regressions include year-dummies to capture

5

We do not report regressions using the sample of IND countries alone since there is no sufficient variation in
observations under each category of eight dummies when the sample includes only the post-EMU period and IND
countries.
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time trends, as well as country pair- dummies to capture unobservable factors affecting trade
between country pairs.
[Table 5 here]
The second regression in Table 5 introduces monetary regime variables. Consistent data
for monetary regimes from International Monetary Fund are available only from 1999. The
period coverage in Table 5 is therefore limited to 1999-2007. The results support our argument
for the importance of monetary policy characteristics on international trade discussed in earlier
section. All coefficients of monetary regimes of both exporting and importing countries are
significant with the exception of the coefficient for the money aggregate anchor regime for
importing countries (Money2). Furthermore, in comparison with column 1 the coefficients for
trade effects of EMU internally and between the EMU and EU/NonEMU become significant.
They remain negative, however.
Turning to the question whether commonly observed EMU effects on trade can be
explained by the shifts in monetary regimes and conduct of monetary policy of the individual
EMU members, as opposed to by the introduction of the common currency per se, we must
identify EMU effects more clearly and separate EMU effects from EU effects. The coefficients
for EMU countries in the regressions include EU effects since all EMU countries are also
members of the EU. We return to this issue.
In order to evaluate the relative impact of each monetary regime we perform pairwise
significance tests for the statistical differences between coefficients for the impact of each
regime. The results are reported in Table 6. As the Wald-Test statistics shows, the coefficient of
the inflation targeting regime dummy for exporting countries is significantly different from other
monetary regime dummies. The monetary regimes of importing countries seem to matter less
11

since no single regime dominates the trade creation effect. The effects of Inflation target, Money
aggregate and Exchange rate anchor for importing countries are not significantly different from
one another (Table 6).
[Table 6 here]
4. Bilateral trade effects of joining the EU, the EMU and monetary regimes.
In Tables 7 and 8 we calculate the percent change in total trade of a country in one group
with a country in the same or another group from changes in EU and EMU memberships and
from adoption of particular monetary regimes. The percent change figures are obtained from the
coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 showing effects on log exports. The effects on total trade of, for
example, an EMU country with a Non-EU country (row (2) in Table 7) is obtained by taking the
average of the percent change in exports from an EMU country to a Non-EU country and the
percent change in exports of a Non-EU country to an EMU country. In Table 7, the percent
changes in rows (1), (2), (4), (5) and (7) are transformations of the coefficients in Tables 4 and 5.
The data in these rows are used as inputs in calculations of EMU effects in particular since the
EMU countries are also members of the EU and, therefore, subject to both EU and EMU effects.
Joining the EMU may also be associated with a monetary regime shift.
We use Table 7 to calculate internal and external EU effects on trade, as well as internal
and external EMU effects. For example, row (8) show the bilateral internal EMU effect as the
difference between the percent change of bilateral EMU to EMU trade (relative to bilateral NonEU trade) and the percent change of bilateral EU to EU trade (relative to bilateral Non-EU
trade). The estimated internal EMU effects vary greatly depending on the specification of the
regression. Before discussing different measures of internal EMU effects, external and internal
EU effects as well as external EMU effects are calculated and discussed.
12

Row (1) in the table shows the external EU effect as the percent change in trade between
an EU country outside the EMU and a non-EU country relative to trade between two Non-EU
countries. Three out of the four regressions imply substantial trade diversion6 effects of EU
membership in the sense that EU-membership reduces bilateral trade with non-EU countries.
The external EMU effect in row (3) is obtained by taking the difference between row (2)
showing the change in trade of EMU countries with Non-EU countries and row (1) showing the
external EU effect. The result depends on which set of regressions the estimate is based on. The
regressions for the longer period in Table 4 indicate a positive external EMU effect while the
regressions for the shorter period in Table 5 indicate that joining the EMU adds to the trade
diversion of EU membership.
The changes in row (4) refer to the internal EU effect as the percent change in trade
between two EU members outside the EMU relative to trade between two non-EU countries.
The estimates of this effect are positive in all cases but they vary between +84 percent and +2.1
percent. The lowest estimate is obtained when monetary regimes are included in the regressions
for the period 1999-2007.
Row (5) refers to changes in trade between EMU countries and EU countries outside the
EMU relative to trade between Non-EU countries Thus, these changes incorporate the internal
EU effect as well as an external EMU effect relative to other EU countries. An external EMU
effect relative to EU countries in row (6) can be calculated as the difference between rows (5)
and (4).

6

The trade diversion from trade with Non-EU countries to EU or EMU countries does not imply that there is a
welfare loss, since the change in trade patterns is caused by transactions or information costs rather than by tariffs or
quotas.
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The external EMU effect relative to EU in row (6) can be compared to the external EMU
effect in row (3). There is no obvious reason for these effects to be very different unless EMU
and EU effects interact or the estimate of the EMU effect relative to the EU depends on
unobservable factors. A comparison between the rows show that the two estimates of the
external EMU effect based on data for the shorter time period are consistent while the estimates
based on the longer time series are inconsistent and very sensitive to the sample of countries
included in the regressions. This observation is a cause for concern with respect to the estimates
based on data for the longer period.
Turning to internal bilateral trade effects of EMU membership we produce two
alternative estimates in rows (8) and (9). As noted, one estimate is the bilateral internal EMU
effect in row (8) defined as the difference between row (7) for the percent increase in internal
EMU trade relative to internal non-EU trade and row (4) for the internal EU effect. The estimates
based on the longer data series are extremely large while the estimates based on the shorter time
series are small and even negative (but clearly not statistically significant) when monetary
regime shifts have been accounted for. These results are puzzling
Since joining the EMU involves joining a currency union as well as a change in monetary
regime and conduct of monetary policy a better measure of the trade enhancing effect of the
currency union may be the difference between the percent change in bilateral trade between
EMU countries in row (7) (relative to bilateral NonEU trade) and the percent change in bilateral
trade between EMU and other EU countries (relative to NonEU trade) in row (5). This
unilateral internal EMU effect in row (9) controls for the change in monetary regime and policy
of the trading partner joining the EMU. This effect is the relevant measure of the trade expansion
facing an EU country joining the EMU.
14

The estimate of the unilateral internal EMU effect is also very sensitive to the length of
the estimation period. Estimates based on Table 4 regression are of the magnitude 100 percent
while estimates based on data for the shorter period in Table 5 regressions are of the magnitude
10 percent. It can be noted that controlling for monetary regime of both trading partners
increases the estimate of the internal EMU effect from 8 to 13 percent.
The very large estimates of internal EMU effects based on Table 4 regressions are
consistent with Rose’s (2001) original estimates of currency union effects on trade. We are
nevertheless skeptical of estimates of this magnitude, in particular, because the effects of the
EMU on external trade between the EMU and other EU countries are very large as well. These
effects cannot be explained by the currency union per se. It is possible that EMU effects and EU
effects cannot be clearly disentangled and that the effects of the EMU on the conduct of
monetary policy are not sufficiently accounted for in the monetary regime variables.
The final row in Table 7 shows the trade effect for two countries joining a regional trade
arrangement based on the regressions for the period 1980-2007 in Table 4. These effects are on
the same order of magnitude as the internal EMU effects and the internal EU effect.
[Table 7 here]
In Table 8 trade expansion effects (exports plus imports) of different monetary regimes
are shown in percent relative to trade between two countries belonging to the group “Other” in
the IMF classification. The regime of the exporting country is shown horizontally while the
regime if the importing country is shown vertically. Thus, the diagonal shows the trade effect
when both countries belong to the same group. A pattern emerges although the differences
among regimes are not statistically significant in Table 6 with the exception of inflation targeting
relative to other regimes
15

The strongest trade enhancing effect occurs when both trading partners target inflation
(19.5 percent). Inflation targeting is also the most trade enhancing regime for exporters in trade
with countries using other regimes (15.7 percent on the average), as well as for importers in trade
with exporters using other regimes (13 percent on the average). While countries classified as
adopting Other monetary regime clearly trade less than other countries, there is no clear ranking
of trade effects of Money aggregate targeting, Exchange rate targeting and IMF supported
regimes. Targeting a monetary anchor seems to have the second largest effect for exporters while
ER anchor seems to have the second largest effect for importers. Thus, the only unambiguous
conclusion we can draw from Table 8 is that inflation targeting contributes to trade expansion
independent of the regime of the trading partner.
[Table 8 here]
5. Trade expansion and inflation targeting in Asia
The analysis in the previous section indicates that the trade creation effects of regional
integration going beyond basic trade policy can be substantial. The reduction in a variety of
barriers to mobility of goods and services in Europe has been in process for several decades
within the EU framework. A range of political forces arising in the aftermath of World War II
played an important part in motivating the European countries to trade off a degree of
sovereignty against increased political and economic integration. There are no obvious similar
political motivations for Asian countries to emulate the European model for both widening and
deepening integration in the foreseeable future.
Monetary regime shifts can be implemented by a country without coordination with other
countries. The results presented in the previous section indicate that inflation targeting, in
particular, expands international trade even if trading partners do not adopt the same regime. In
16

this section we take a closer look at the development of international trade of inflation targeting
countries in Asia.
There are many case studies on emerging markets’ economic performance under inflation
targeting. Most of these studies look at output and inflation and focus on the sample of Latin
American and emerging transition countries. In general, these countries adopted inflation
targeting for the purpose of disinflation.7
The statistical evidence supporting inflation targeting as a successful monetary policy
regime is inconclusive. Vega and Winkelried (2005), IMF (2006), and Conçalves and Salles
(2008) suggest that developed and developing countries adopting inflation targeting have
experienced lower inflation as well as better output performance. Ball and Sheridan (2005) argue
that the decline in inflation after the introduction of inflation targeting in OECD countries is
simply the result of inflation reverting to its mean after a period of relatively high inflation. They
do not observe any output effect. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) divide the sample of non
inflation targeting countries into control groups with different regimes in order to evaluate
inflation targeting relative to different benchmarks. They find that the choice of control group is
important for the results. Inflation targeting leads to reduced inflation in countries relative the
period before inflation targeting but when these countries are compared with non-targeting
countries there is no gain.
Monetary policy consideration cannot be disentangled from exchange rate policy.
Inflation targeting requires exchange rate flexibility. When adopting inflation targeting, most
countries accept that market fundamentals determine the exchange rates although there are
varying degrees of foreign exchange market intervention. Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000)
7

See, for example, see Bernanke, Lauback, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) and Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004).
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note that under inflation targeting “exchange rate stability can be defined as a policy framework
with an exchange rate value credible enough to convince markets that the inflation target will not
be threatened by a currency crisis.” (p. 19). This statement implies that there are constraints on
intervention under inflation targeting but intervention can contribute to a degree of exchange rate
stability as long as the exchange rate is consistent with longer term fundamentals.
Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer find in case studies of six emerging countries8, that six of
the countries experienced several years of sound macroeconomic policies and exchange rate
stability after the adoption of inflation targeting. The exception was Brazil where the exchange
rate was under pressure in 1999.
Rose (2007) find that exchange rate volatility of inflation targeting countries is relatively
low. He uses cross-sectional analysis of 42 industrialized and emerging market based on monthly
data for exchange rates for the period 1990-2005. Edwards (2006) finds that the adoption of
inflation targeting did not increase nominal and real exchange rate volatility.
The performance of inflation targeting countries in terms of real exchange rate volatility
as well as general macroeconomic stability can contribute to the trade expansion associated with
inflation targeting as noted in the previous section.
Turning to experiences with inflation targeting in Asia, four countries have adopted this
regime as of 2009 as shown in Table 3. The four countries are Indonesia, the Philippines, South
Korea and Thailand. Indonesia shifted from monetary aggregate targeting to inflation targeting in
2005. The Philippines made the same shift in 2003, South Korea in 2001. Thailand shifted from
an IMF supported regime9 to inflation targeting in 2001. The Philippines and South Korea are

8
9

Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Israel, Poland, and South Africa.
See Table 2 for definitions of regimes
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considered independently floating while Indonesia and Thailand intervene to dampen exchange
rate fluctuations.
Table 3 shows the exchange rate and monetary regimes for other Asian countries as well.
China, Hong Kong and Singapore are exchange rate anchor countries. India and Malaysia are
classified by IMF as adopting “Other” monetary regime in combination with managed floating.
In other words, the latter countries have neither a pegged exchange rate nor a floating rate.
Although they do not announce an exchange rate target they are likely to have one.
Figure 1 shows how the volume of exports and the ratio of exports to GDP developed
before and after the adoption of inflation targeting in Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines and
Indonesia. The volume of exports increased in all the countries before as well as after the regime
shift until the financial crisis in 2008 caused a decline in exports. The export ratio, on the other
hand, seems to have declined for a period after the adoption of inflation targets in all the four
countries. The decline seems to have been temporary in Thailand and South Korea but the
declines in the Philippines and Indonesia look like trends.
[Figure 1 here]
On the face of it the patterns in Figure 1 seem to contradict the empirical results
presented in the previous section. However, the patterns could be explained if the shift to
inflation targeting also caused real exchange rate adjustment. Figure 2 shows real exchange rate
developments and ratios of exports to GDP in nine Asian countries. The real exchange rates of
both Indonesia and the Philippines have been appreciating and the export ratios have been
declining since the countries adopted inflation targets. South Korea’s export ratio fell to begin
with along with an appreciating currency after the adoption of inflation targeting in 2001 but
since 2003 the export ratio has been increasing in spite of an appreciating real exchange rate.
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Thailand also began a period of real appreciation at the time of the shift to inflation targeting in
2001 but the trendwise increase in the export ratio continued for most of the period.
Observation of the diagrams in Figure 2 alone gives the impression of a negative effect
on the export ratio of inflation targeting. Thus, the positive effect on trade of the inflation target
regime observed in the analysis in the previous section is conditional on controlling for real
exchange rate changes. The shift to inflation targeting may cause a real appreciation for a period
because the monetary regime shift is often associated with a shift towards a more disciplined
macroeconomic policy. The real appreciation should be temporary, however. Therefore, the trade
creating effect of a shift to inflation targeting may not be observable during an adjustment
period.
[Figure 2 here]

6. Conclusions and Implications
Searching for a stable monetary regime is a challenge for central bankers around the world and a
crucial issue among Asian policymakers for two reasons. First, Asian crisis-hit economies during
1997-98 were forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate system. Since then, the exchange rates
of most Asian countries have been floating more or less freely. Second, in the past two decades
Asian economies have experienced a marked increased in international trade and capital flows
particularly from, and lately to, developed countries. Although openness often improves long-run
macroeconomic performance, it may expose countries to the risks of economic and financial
disruption in times of global shocks. Choosing the right monetary and exchange rate regimes can
be critical for alleviating the effects of external shocks and enhancing the prospects for long-term
export led economic growth.
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The European model for deeper regional monetary integration and increased monetary
stability may seem attractive. The evidence presented here and in other papers indicates that the
European Monetary Union (EMU) has contributed to increased trade but the magnitude of the
internal trade creating effects remain controversial and estimates range from very large in the
order of magnitude of 100 percent to small and almost negligible. It has proven difficult to
disentangle currency union effects from long term trends of increased integration within the
internal market, and to disentangle the effects of the creation of a currency union from effects of
simultaneous shifts in the monetary regimes and the conduct of monetary policy in the countries
joining the currency union.
The estimates of very large trade creating effects of the EMU in regressions for the
period 1980-2007 are associated with large trade effects relative to countries outside the currency
union as well. We take that as an indication that other factors than the creation of the currency
union per se explain most of the trade creation. Effects of deepening of the internal market and of
changes in the conduct of monetary policy may be particularly important.
The political circumstances that led to deepened integration, including monetary
integration are not easily reproduced. Even if the political will for increased economic
integration exists the most immediate gains are likely to follow from the reduction of barriers to
mobility of goods, services and factors of production. There is no strong evidence that a currency
union contributes much to such mobility. The choice of monetary regime as well as the conduct
of monetary policy matter, however. The results presented here indicate that inflation targeting
contributes substantially to trade. The trade creating effects of the EMU may also be partly
explained by the shift to inflation targeting by the European Central Bank for countries that prior
to the EMU had central banks with low credibility.
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Figure 1. Exports/GDP during the pre- and post adoption of inflation targeting regimes for four
Asian countries, quarterly data, 1993:Q1 – 2008: Q4
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Note: The date for the adoption of the inflation targeting regime is from Rose (2007).
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Figure 2. Real Exchange Rates (relative to the U.S. dollar) and Exports for our sample of Asian
Economies
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1-Jan-2008

Romania

Bulgaria
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Korea, South

Jordan
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Venezuela
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South Africa

Sri Lanka

Singapore

Russia

Romania

Peru

Paraguay

Pakistan

Nigeria

Morocco
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Note: this table lists the dates of joining EU and EMU from 1973-2009. However, our sample coverage in the empirical test is based on the
period of 1980-2007. Countries in group (1) EMU is classified as EU/NonEMU before the time of joining EMU and countries in group (2)
EU/nonEMU are classified as non EU members before joining EU. Iceland and Norway are not EU members and Sweden did not become
members of the EU until 1995. These three countries have participated in the European Economic Area (EEA) since 1992; therefore, they are
treated the same way as EU members.

1-Jan-2007

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

1-Jan-2007

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain
Greece

1-Jan-2001

1-Jan-2009

India

Hungary

Indonesia

Hong Kong

Lithuania

Portugal
Malta

Egypt

Colombia

China

Latvia

Ireland

United States

Switzerland

Netherlands

Czech Republic

Chile

Ecuador

Sweden

EEA, 1992
1-May-2004

Germany

New Zealand

Bulgaria

Cyprus

Norway

EEA, 1992

France

Japan

Brazil

Luxembourg

Iceland

EEA, 1992

Finland

Canada

Argentina

Emerging Markets

Croatia

United Kingdom

1973

Belgium

Australia

Industrial Countries

3. Non EU

Estonia

Denmark

1973

Austria

Date of joining EU

2. EU/NonEMU

Italy

1-Jan-1999

Date of joining EMU

1. EMU

Table 1. List of Three Groups of Countries in Our Empirical Analysis

Table 2. Data Descriptions and Sources
Real exports

The logarithm of the real value (in US dollar) of bilateral exports (the nominal values of
bilateral exports are adjusted to the real values using the U.S. GDP deflator (2005=100)).
Sources: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, August 2009 and the International Financial
Statistics.

Real GDP

The log of the real GDP. Source: The Penn World Table, PWT 6.3.

Population

The log of the total population. Source: The Penn World Table, PWT 6.3.

RTA

A dummy of one if a pair of countries belong to the same regional trade arrangement. RTAs
include ASEAN-Association of South East Asia (1992), CAN-Andean Community (1998),
MERCOSUR-Southern Common Market (1991), NAFTA-North American Free Trade
Agreement (1994), CER-Closer Economic Relation (1983), and SAPTA-South Asian
Preferential Trade Agreement (1995). European Union is not included because dummies for
member countries are included in the EU/EMU dummies. Source: Information on RTAs is
from the WTO website.

Real ER

The real exchange rate (RER) is the nominal exchange rate relative to U.S. dollars
(2005=100) adjusted by the relative price index (2005=100). Source: Nominal exchange rate
is from the Penn World Table, PWT 6.3

ER Anchor

A dummy of one in the years that a country uses the exchange rate (ER) anchor as a
monetary policy framework. Under ER anchor, the ER serves as the nominal anchor or
intermediate target of monetary policy and monetary authority stands ready to buy or sell
foreign exchange to maintain the exchange rate at its pre-announced level or range.
Exchange rate regimes with no separate legal tender, currency board arrangements, fixed
pegs with and without bands, and crawling pegs with and without bands are covered under
the ER anchor regime. Source: IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and
Monetary Policy Frameworks

Money Anchor

A dummy of one in the years that a country uses the monetary aggregate anchor as a
monetary policy framework. Under this framework, the targeted monetary aggregate serves
as the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy. The monetary authority
uses its instruments to achieve a target growth rate for a monetary aggregate, such as reserve
money, M1, or M2. Source: IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and
Monetary Policy Framework

Inflation
Targeting (IT)

A dummy of one in the years that a country uses the inflation targeting (IT) framework.
Under IT, the monetary authority announces medium-term numerical targets for inflation,
which is the intermediate target of monetary policy, and commits to use its instruments to
achieve the announced target. Source: IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate
Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks

IMF

A dummy of one in the years that a country uses the monetary and exchange rate policies
that are guided and supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Source: IMF’s
Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks
A dummy of one in the years that a country uses other monetary policy framework.
According to IMF, this includes a country that has no explicitly stated nominal anchor but
rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy, or there is no relevant
information available for the country. Source: IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate
Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks

Other (MP
regime)
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Table 3. Exchange Rate- and Monetary Regimes for Asian Countries
Country
China

Hong Kong
India

Year

Exchange Rate Regimes

Monetary Policy Regimes

1999-2006

Other Conventional Fixed Peg
Arrangements

Exchange Rate Anchor (against a single
currency) and Monetary Aggregate

2007

Crawling pegs

Exchange Rate Anchor (against a single
currency) and Monetary Aggregate

2008-present

Crawling pegs

Exchange Rate Anchor (against a single
currency)

1999-present

Currency Board Arrangements

Exchange Rate Anchor

1999

Independently Floating

Monetary Aggregate

2000

Independently Floating

Other

Managed Floating with No Preannounced Path for Exchange Rate

Other

1999-2001

Independently Floating

IMF

2002-2003

Managed Floating with No Preannounced Path for Exchange Rate

Monetary Aggregate and IMF

2004-2006

Managed Floating with No Preannounced Path for Exchange Rate

Monetary Aggregate

2007-present

Managed Floating with No Preannounced Path for Exchange Rate

Inflation Targeting Framework

1999-2000

Independently Floating

Monetary Aggregate and IMF

2001-present

Independently Floating

Inflation Targeting Framework

1999-2005

Other Conventional Fixed Peg
Arrangements

Exchange Rate Anchor (against a single
currency)

2006-2007

Managed Floating with No Preannounced Path for Exchange Rate

Other

1999-2002

Independently Floating

Monetary Aggregate and IMF

2003-present

Independently Floating

Inflation Targeting Framework

1999-2007

Managed Floating with No Preannounced Path for Exchange Rate

Other

2008-present

Managed Floating with No Preannounced Path for Exchange Rate

Exchange Rate Anchor (against a
composite)

1999-2000

Independently Floating

IMF

2001

Independently Floating

Inflation Targeting Framework

Managed Floating with No Preannounced Path for Exchange Rate

Inflation Targeting Framework

2001-present
Indonesia

Korea

Malaysia

Philippines

Singapore

Thailand

2002-present

Source: De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Frameworks, International
Monetary Fund.
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Table 4. The EMU and EU Effects on Exports, 1980-2007
IND

ALL

Coefficient

Std Err

Coefficient

Std Err

Log of Real GDP1

1.103**

0.070

1.297**

0.017

Log of Real GDP2

1.233**

0.070

0.984**

0.017

Log of Population1

-1.598**

0.224

-1.053**

0.038

Log of Population2

-0.471**

0.224

-1.013**

0.038

Real ER1

0.061*

0.035

-0.0004**

0.0001

Real ER2

-0.081**

0.035

-0.00001

0.0001

0.249

0.162

0.317**

0.051

EMU1 to EMU2

0.602**

0.044

0.565**

0.035

EMU1 to EU/nonEMU2

0.163**

0.044

0.346**

0.030

EMU1 to NonEU2

0.230**

0.047

0.018

0.021

EU/nonEMU1 to EMU2

0.412**

0.044

0.349**

0.030

EU/nonEMU1 to EU/nonEMU2

0.123**

0.029

0.127**

0.020

EU/nonEMU1 to NonEU2

0.088**

0.026

-0.095**

0.013

-0.026

0.047

-0.111**

0.022

0.060**

0.026

-0.115**

0.013

-19.318**

0.000

-19.100**

0.677

RTA

NonEU1 to EMU2
NonEU1 to EU/nonEMU2
Constant
No. of Observations

11,981

101,697

No. of Country Pairs

462

4,289

F-Statistics

214.64

677.15

Prob > F-Statistics

0.000

0.000

Within R-Square

0.446

0.408

Country Pair Dummy

Yes

Yes

Year Dummy
Emerging market Dummy ×
Year Dummy

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

The dependent variable is the log of real exports. *, ** indicate the significance levels of 10% and 5%,
respectively. 1 stands for an exporting country and 2 for an importing country. For the sample, IND =
industrial countries and ALL = industrialized countries plus emerging markets.
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Table 5. The EMU, EU and Monetary Regime Effects on Exports, 1999-2007
ALL

ALL

Coefficient

Std Err

Coefficient

Std Err

Log of Real GDP1

0.867**

0.047

0.610**

0.052

Log of Real GDP2

1.478**

0.047

1.198**

0.052

Log of Population1

-1.475**

0.130

-2.035**

0.136

Log of Population2

-1.229**

0.130

-1.839**

0.136

Real ER1

0.028**

0.008

0.047**

0.008

Real ER2

-0.099**

0.008

-0.077**

0.008

EMU1 to EMU2

0.021

0.075

-0.013*

0.078

EMU1 to EU/nonEMU2

-0.032

0.050

-0.097**

0.052

-0.200**

0.045

-0.168**

0.046

0.005

0.050

-0.039

0.052

0.090**

0.028

0.009

0.029

-0.025

0.020

-0.031

0.020

NonEU1 to EMU2

-0.138**

0.045

-0.099**

0.046

NonEU1 to EU/nonEMU2

-0.105**

0.020

-0.127**

0.020

Inflation Targeting1

0.086**

0.015

Money1

0.040**

0.015

IMF1

0.027**

0.010

ER Anchor 1

0.025**

0.012

Inflation Targeting2

0.069**

0.015

0.012

0.015

IMF2

0.052**

0.010

ER Anchor 2

0.061**

0.012

7.473**

2.354

EMU1 to NonEU2
EU/nonEMU1 to EMU2
EU/nonEMU1 to EU/nonEMU2
EU/nonEMU1 to NonEU2

Money2

Constant
No. of Observations
No. of Country Pairs
F-Statistics
Prob > F-Statistics
Within R-Square
Country Pair Dummy
Year Dummy
Emerging market Dummy ×
Year Dummy

-14.089**

1.744

38,599
4,289
594.48
0.000
0.342
Yes
Yes

38,599
4,289
399.42
0.000
0.349
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

The dependent variable is the log of real exports. *, ** indicate the significance levels of 10% and 5%,
respectively. 1 stands for an exporting country and 2 for an importing country. For the sample, IND =
industrial countries and ALL = industrialized countries plus emerging markets. The RTA dummy is
dropped in the country- and time- fixed effect model due to time-invariant of the data after 1999.
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Table 6. The Wald-Test for the equality between two coefficients of monetary regimes for:
Exporting countries
Inflation Targeting1

Money1

Money1

8.44 (0.0037)

IMF1

12.41 (0.0004)

0.56 (0.4526)

ER Anchor 1

12.20 (0.0005)

0.94 (0.3333)

IMF1

0.02 (0.8762)

Importing countries
Inflation Targeting2

Money2

Money2

13.14 (0.0003)

IMF2

1.02 (0.3115)

5.11 (0.0238)

ER Anchor2

0.20 (0.6510)

9.19 (0.0024)

IMF2

0.36 (0.5504)

The number in the parenthesis is the probability value of the F-statistics.
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Table 7. EU, EMU and RTA effects in percent on bilateral trade within and between members
of different country groups (EU stands for the EU/NonEMU group). Effects on bilateral trade
are calculated as the averages of percent change in exports and percent change in imports based
on coefficients in log in tables 4 and 5. Rows (1), (2), (4), (5) and (7) refer to percent change
relative to trade between NonEU countries. Rows in bold font show estimates for internal and
external effects of the EU and the EMU. Row (3) refers to differences between the changes in
row (2) and row (1) calculated as [(100+change in row (2))/(100+change in row (1))]-1. Row
(6) refers to difference between changes in rows (5) and row (4), row 8 refers to difference
between rows (7) and (4) while row (9) refers to the difference between rows (7) and (5)

Calculated from

Country coverage
Period
(1) Non-EU to/from EU
(External EU-effect)
(2) Non-EU to/from EMU
(External EU+EMU effect)
(3) Implied External EMU effect
as difference between (2) and (1)
(4) EU to/from EU
(Internal EU-effect)
(5) EMU to/from EU
(Internal EU effect plus External
EMU-effect relative to EU)
(6) Implied External EMU effect
relative to EU as difference
between (5) and (4)
(7) EMU to/from EMU
(Internal EU+Internal EMU
effect)
(8) Bilateral Internal EMU-effect
as difference between (7) and (4)
(9) Unilateral Internal EMU effect
as difference between (7) and (5)
(9) RTA (free trade area effect)

Table 4

Table 4

Table 5
(no
monetary
regime
dummies)

IND

ALL

ALL

ALL

1980-2007

1980-2007

1999-2007

1999-2007

+18.4

-21.5

-13.6

-16.2

+31.6

-9.2

-32.1

-26.3

+11.1

+15.7

-21.4

-12.1

+33

+84

+23

+2.1

+102

+72.7

-3

-14.3

+51.9

-6.1

-21.1

-16.1

+300

+267.3

+5.0

-2.9

+201

+99.6

-14.6

-4.9

+98

+113

+8.2

+13.2

+77

+107

33

Table 5
(Including
monetary
regimes
dummies)

Table 8. Monetary Regime effects on exports plus imports in percent relative to trade between
two countries classified as Other

Inflation
Targeting

Money

IMF

ER
Anchor

Other

Average
for
importer
regime

Inflation
Targeting

19.5

13.4

11.8

11.6

8.6

13

Money

12.4

6.2

4.6

4.4

1.4

5.8

IMF

17.3

11.2

9.6

9.3

6.4

10.5

ER Anchor

18.5

12.3

10.7

10.5

7.5

11.9

11

4.8

3.2

3

0

4.4

15.7

9.6

8

7.8

4.8

9.2

Exporter ⎝
Importer τ

Other
Average for
exporter
regime

.
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